We propose a risk-sharing framework for bilateral contracts to find the optimal pair, initial price and amount of collateral, with presence of default risks, collateral, and funding spreads. The derived optimal collateral can be used for contracts between financial firms and non-financial firms. For inter-dealers contracts, which are governed by regulations, the optimal collateral can interpret circumstances where the margin requirement is indeed optimal. We will see later that absence of market frictions is an inherent assumption for the margin requirement in Basel III. In addition, as we consider entity-specific information in bilateral pricing, law of one price does not hold. Moreover, inclusion of funding spreads causes asymmetry in individual pricing. Thus, the two parties should enter derivative contracts with a negotiated price, which is the other part of the solution of the risk-sharing framework. The risk-sharing framework defines the negotiation as a problem that maximizes the sum of utilities of the two parties. The optimal price from the risk-sharing framework does not have asymmetry due to different funding spreads of each party.
 Introduction
One important example that will be discussed by our model is Treasury bonds. As asked by Hull & White (a,b) , if funding cost should be really considered, possibly due to market frictions, why do banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding costs? The reason why banks buy Treasury instruments can be attributed to the relative bargaining power of the government and tax benefits to the banks buying Treasury bonds. Including funding spreads in derivative transactions have other important issues as well as the asymmetric prices such as wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders and large asset/liability asymmetry in accounting. For those issues, readers may want to refer to Albanese & Andersen () ; Andersen et al. () .
We describe the negotiation problem as maximizing the sum of utilities of both parties and we call this a risk-sharing problem. In the risk-sharing problem, we maximize the utilities over a pair of price and collateral. We call the optimal pair risk-sharing contract. In developed pricing methodologies, the asymmetry between two parties by funding spread arose because only one party's funding spread is considered. Since, in the risk-sharing problem, we take funding spreads of both parties into the valuation, we recover symmetric derivative prices.
It should be mentioned that the asymmetry due to funding spreads is not the only motivation for the risk-sharing framework. The risk-sharing framework is introduced because a "value to me", in the classical pricing theory, may not have practical significance with absence of law of one price. To explain the motivation, let us consider a dealer who wants to enter a certain contract and has two candidates as the counterparty; one is free of default risk and the other one is not. Then the dealer can enter the deal with the risk-less counterparty without CVA, or with the risky counterparty endowed by a CVA price. These two cases are theoretically the same, but practically different. For the counterparty default risk, there are operational costs for hedging default risk and the actual cost of default may be different from the calculated CVA. Thus, for the dealer, the risky counterparty should pay more than the calculated CVA as a buffer to enter the contract. However, this buffer-price may be lower or not necessary when the dealer has no candidate except the defaultable counterparty. Therefore, entering a contract should be understood as a negotiation problem under absence of law of one price.
The other part of the solution in the risk-sharing framework is collateral. In recent times, most OTC derivative contracts are collateralized. There are multiple procedures for the margin, but in bilateral contracts, it is general to post variation and initial margin. In our model, the focus is on variation margin which traces mark-to-market exposures. As stated in BIS & IOSCO (, p.), "for variation margin, the full amount necessary to fully collateralise the mark-tomarket exposure of the non-centrally cleared derivatives must be exchanged." Because banks should implement the requirement until , the full collateralization on variation margin is being settled as a market convention in inter-dealer transactions. On the other hand, there is no such convention between banks and sovereign or corporate clients. Indeed, it is partly or not collateralized for contracts between financial firms and non-financial firms. Therefore, the risk-sharing framework provides the optimal amount of variation margin for the contract between a financial firm and non-financial firm. Since inter-dealer contracts are governed by regulation in practice, we interpret the meaning behind the margin requirement.
The optimal collateral in our model is represented by a certain stochastic process. Thus, full variation margin may not be optimal in general. However, we do not conclude that the  convention is unreasonable. Variation margin is posted on a daily or intraday basis. If the amount was calculated by a complicated rule at each time, the amount would be unacceptable for some parties and this can be a possible cause of conflict. Hence, rather than coming to a sensitive conclusion, we analyze the situation for the margin requirement to be optimal. The market convention will turn out to be based on certain conditions on funding cost/benefit considered in derivative prices, hedging strategy taken by two parties, and the initial price.
To be more precise on the hedging strategy, it will be shown that the two parties should hedge the delta risk of the mark-to-market exposure without any adjustment for full collateralization to be optimal. This can explain the reason why the contracts between a financial firm and sovereign or corporate clients are not or partially collateralized. Moreover, the optimality of full-collateralization requires that the funding spread of each party should not be transferred to counterparties. This conditions can be understood that there is a hidden belief in the margin requirement that the considered financial markets are frictionless that MM theorem can be valid. Otherwise, the full collateralization is not optimal for both contractors. The certain initial price, for the margin requirement to be optimal, will be given in Section ..
One mathematical difficulty to deal with the risk-sharing problem is that the amount by breach of contract is given by piece-wise concave functions. Mathematically similar problems were solved by Bo (); Bo & Capponi (); Carassus & Pham (); Yang et al. () . Carassus & Pham () considered portfolio optimization problems that the agent switches utilities. They used duality method, but in our problem, we can not impose a positive constraint for the portfolio. In Bo (); Bo & Capponi () , the piece-wise concave property arose by different lending/borrowing rates and they solved the optimization problem by using HJB equations. In their problem, the associated HJB equations had a homothetic property. Moreover, with a mild assumption that the lending rate is smaller than the borrowing rate, the Hamiltonian became continuous in their cases. However, in our problem, we should deal with two state processes taken by two utilities, so we can not make use of a similar approach.
Even though our modeling is motivated by typical principal-agent setup, the mathematical structure is atypical to apply some established methods. One may wnat to see one party as an agent subject to the action taken by other party who can be seen as a principal. However, there are funding costs in delivering collateral. Moreover, posting collateral does not reduce loss given defaults for the posting party. Therefore, if one party optimizes the risk-sharing problem without considering the other party, the solution is trivially attaind at extreme ends, e.g., ∞, −∞, etc. Thus, we can not use the methods such as the one developed by Cvitanić et al. () that principal's problem is solved on the optimal action of the agent. Mathematically, the risk-sharing problem is an irregular optimal investment problem rather than principal-agent problems.
One may want to use stochastic calculus of variation as in Cvitanic & Zhang () . Then, we encounter a coupled forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) which has a discontinuous coefficient in the forward drift. Chen et al. () solved a similar discontinuous FBSDE motivated by "regime-switching" term structure model. They also considered FBSDEs with discontinuous forward drift, but it is not easy to generalize their results to our problem. The FBSDEs which can be attained by stochastic calculus of variation in our problem have a degenerate volatility and unbounded coefficients. Moreover, the FBSDEs are multi- dimensional since the risk-sharing framework is basically one type of principal-agent problems. One exception that we can expect the existence and uniqueness of the FBSDEs is when we consider min-variance pricing and impose a restriction to loss rates and default intensities of the two parties. However, the conditions on default risks for solvability of the FBSDEs are too restrictive, so we report a heuristic derivation of an FBSDE involved in this case in Appendix.
Instead, we circumvent the above difficulties by imposing some conditions on funding spreads depending on choices of utilities. For the funding spread, we assume that the lending and borrowing rates are the same for each party. To be more precise, the two parties fund themselves on their own funding rate which may not be the same as OIS rate, but the lending and borrowing rates are the same. Moreover, the funding costs/benefits for delivering collateral of one or both parties will be ignored for characterization of the optimal solution. This funding condition can be understood that the party is an entity which invests the capital without or with a small leverage, or the party can post collateral with secured funding. Even though the secured funding for variation margin is not so general, some realistic cases are discussed by Albanese et al. () . In addition, This setup on funding spreads can be partly justified by the results in Lee & Zhou () which showed that, in many classes of derivatives, hedgers do not need to switch funding state between lending and borrowing positions. In particular, it is guaranteed that a hedger does not enter borrowing state and the lending rate is same as OIS rate, we can ignore the funding impacts.
In our model, we include default risk, funding spreads, and collateral. We consider incomplete markets that hedgers can not access to assets for hedging default risk such as bonds and CDSs. The reference filtration is generated by a Brownian motion. The mark-to-market exposure is calculated as clean price which is the classical risk-neutral price without default risks and funding spreads. This paper is organized as follows.
In Section , the risk-sharing problem is introduced. We start from defining a filtration and making an assumption on default intensities. Then, we describe cash-flows which are determined by dividends, margins, and close-out amount. The default exposure will be defined to be incremental in the cash-flows. Both parties entering the contract will have a portfolio depending on the cash-flows. The introduced risk-sharing problem is maximizing the sum of utilities of discounted portfolio values at termination of the contract. In Section ., the original form of risk-sharing problem is reduced so that it is represented on the reference filtration. Then we define admissible sets more precisely with this reduced problem. We mainly deal with the reduced problem in this paper. In Section , we define a dynamic version of the main problem, and the optimal collateral is characterized by martingale optimality principle. Then examples are given in Section . We compare two types of contracts: a contract between two financial firms and contract between a financial firm and non-financial firm. Moreover, the example of a Treasury bond shows how the asymmetric prices due to funding impacts are adjusted in the risk-sharing framework. This example explains why banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding rates.
We consider two parties entering a bilaterally cleared contract. We call the two parties "hedger" and "counterparty", respectively. In what follows, an index H (resp. C) is used to stand for the hedger (resp. counterparty). The hedger represents a financial firm, and the counterparty may or may not be a financial firm, e.g. a corporate or sovereign client. In other words, we consider the two cases: a contract between a financial firm and non-financial firm, a contract between different financial firms. Financial firms trade risky assets to hedge when entering a contract, but non-financial firms do not. We sometimes refer to financial firms as banks or dealers. For readers not to be confused, we make the table: hedger (H) counterparty (C) financial firm (dealer, bank) financial firm (dealer, bank) or non-financial firm We consider a probability space (Ω, G, P) with physical probability P and let E denote the expectation under P. For i ∈ {H, C},
satisfying P(τ i = 0) = 0 and P(τ i > t) > 0, ∀t ∈ R + . Let τ i , i ∈ {H, C}, represent default times of the hedger and counterparty. We denote that
where T > 0 is the maturity of a certain derivative contract. (W t ) t≥0 is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion under P. The reference filtration F = (F t ) t≥0 is the usual natural filtration of (W t ) t≥0 . The full filtration G is defined as
Thus, for any i ∈ {H, C}, τ i is a G-stopping time but may fail to be an F-stopping time. Let us equipped with a filtered probability space (Ω, G, G, P). Unless stated, every process is a (G, P)-semimartingale. Let P (F) (resp. P (G)) denote the σ-algebra of F-progressive (resp. Gprogressive) sets on Ω × [0, T ] and P F (resp. P G ) denote the set of all P (F)-measurable (resp. P (G)-measurable) processes. As a convention, for any G-progressively measurable process (u t ) t≥0 , and (G,
where the integral is well defined. In addition, for any G-stopping time θ and process (ξ t ) t≥0 , we denote
In what follows, for i ∈ {H, C}, t ≥ 0, we denote G i t ≔ P(τ i > t|F t ), and
The following assumption stands throughout this paper. 
and the process M i , given by
is a (G, P)-martingale.
and
In general, it is not the case. Moreover, by (i) in Assumption ., τ avoids any F-stopping time (see Coculescu & Nikeghbali, , Corollary .). In other words, for any F-stopping time τ F ,
The next lemma is borrowed from Bielecki et al. () .
(i) Let U be an F s -measurable, integrable random variable for some s ≥ 0. Then, for any t ≤ s,
be a real-valued, F-predictable process and E|Uτ| < ∞. Then,
We define spaces of random variables, and stochastic processes as follows.
Definition .. Let m ∈ N and p ≥ 2.
• L p T : the set of all F T -measurable random variables ξ, such that
•
. Hedging Portfolio under Bilateral Contracts
In this section, under CVA, DVA, funding spreads, and collateral, we define the two parties' hedging portfolios for entering a new contract. We mostly describe the hedging portfolio in view of the hedger. Then the portfolio of the counterparty can be derived by the same way. In addition, CVA and DVA will be incremental, which means that we consider the difference between CVA/DVA with the new contract and without the new contract. We begin this section with explaining cash-flows in bilateral contracts. We first describe nonincremental cash-flows and modify the definition so as to be incremental. For now, we consider a hedger and counterparty who do not have any contract before and want to enter a "new" bilateral contract which exchanges promised dividends. We denote the accumulated dividend process by D
N
, and D N is assumed to be F-adapted càdlàg and determined independently of defaults. The value of D N is determined by an n-dimensional F-adapted (i.e., nondefaultable) underlying asset S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) that satisfies the following stochastic differential equation (SDE):
where σ i ∈ R d and µ i ∈ R are F-predictable. If we denote µ ∈ R n and σ ∈ R n×d such that (µ) i = µ i and row(σ) i = σ i , (.) can be written as
It is not assumed that n = d, in other words, the considered market may or may not be complete regardless of whether assets to hedge default risk, such as CDSs and bonds, are traded. In this paper, we consider markets with absence of assets to hedge the default risk. We only assume that for all t, σ t is of full rank so that we can define the risk premium Λ as a solution of
where 1 ≔ (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R d and r is an F-adapted process which represents overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate. Λ is used later for a pricing measure to define close-out amount. Recall that the existence of Λ guarantees arbitrage-free condition in classical context. However, since the classical definition of arbitrage opportunity does not reflect adequately the hedger-specific nature of bilateral contracts, there have been many studies to redefine arbitrage opportunity properly in the context of bilateral contracts. The condition being developed is slightly different from papers to papers, but often absence of arbitrage opportunity is obtained with similar conditions to (.) (for example, see Bielecki & Rutkowski, , Proposition .).
We set, as a convention, a positive value (resp. negative) of dividend process at a certain moment means that the hedger pays to (resp. is paid by) the counterparty. For example, if the hedger sells a put option on S with the exercise price κ and maturity T , then
Note that the initial price exchanged at initiation of the contract is not a part of D N . We will include the initial price in the hedging portfolios as their initial value. Because jumps of an F-adapted càdlàg process are exhausted by may not be fully honored at one party's default. For the default risk, covenants of the closeout amount and collateral are documented in a Credit Support Annex  before initiation of the contract. At the event of default, the dividend stream stops and CSA close-out amount should be settled. However, because of the default, the defaulting party would not be able to pay the full close-out amount. To mitigate the risk of losses at default, collateral is exchanged between the two parties. In bilateral contracts, variation margin and initial margin are posted in general. The close-out amount is often determined as mark-to-market exposure.
As stated in BIS & IOSCO (, p.), "the amount of variation margin reflects the size of this current exposure," and it is recommended that "the full amount necessary to fully collateralise the mark-to-market exposure of the non-centrally cleared derivatives must be exchanged" (BIS & IOSCO, , p.). Even though the variation margin traces the full amount of exposure, another margin procedure is required because there is a gap between the bankruptcy and the actual day of settlement. The delay occurs for verifying if the default actually happened, collecting information of the contract, finding the best counterparty to replace the defaulting party, etc (Murphy, ) . Since posting variation margin stops when one party defaults, there is a gap between the amount of variation margin posted at the last day before the default, and the mark-to-market exposure at the actual settlement day. For this gap risk, initial margin is posted and the amount of initial margin is usually calculated as a risk measure.
In our model, only variation margin is a part of the control variables of our stochastic control problem that will be introduced later. We exclude gap risk and initial margin for several reasons. First, if we take gap risk into account, we should consider too many scenarios (see Brigo & Pallavicini, ) . Moreover, we believe that we can treat initial margin in a similar way by defining an admissible set of initial margin as a similar form. We do not mean that the pricing equation with initial margin on market convention can be dealt with similarly. When initial margin is calculated as a risk measure, then the involved pricing equation should refer to a future value at each time step. Thus, we encounter an anticipative BSDE (ABSDE for short), but solving ABSDE numerically is a challenging problem (see Agarwal et al., ) . However, when we put margins into a stochastic control problem, we have a leeway for an admissible set for our convenience. Then, we can handle initial margin by a similar way that variation margin is dealt with in this paper. We admit that initial margin is an important issue in practice, but mainly for simplicity, we only include variation margin in our framework. Now, we depict the close-out amount and variation margin mathematically. One of the popular choices to calculate the market exposure is clean price which is basically the classical risk-neutral price. As used in the classical pricing, we use the "so-called" risk-free rate. Note that it is a little out of context to call it the risk-free rate since arguments under bilateral contracts are from the reality that dealers can not access to the risk-free rate, yet it is acknowledged that OIS rate is the best proxy for the so-called risk-free rate. Thus, in what follows, we use OIS rate for evaluating the clean price, and denote it by (r t ) t≥0 . r is F-adapted and we let B denote  A part of ISDA Master Agreement.
 the the money market account on r, namely
We can find the pricing measure Q such that B −1 S i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are (F, Q)-local martingales because σ is of full rank as in (.). Let e N denote the new mark-to-market exposure at t ≤ T . We assume that the market exposure is calculated as clean price:
By Assumption ., we can derive some properties of e N .
Proof. (i) is from the definition and (ii) is a directly obtained from (i). For (iii), notice that
T ,loc such that for any t,
where W Q is the Brownian motion under Q, i.e.,
Therefore, e N follows the SDE: 
where D t is the Malliavin derivative operator at t and ∇ S is the classical gradient. We shall see later that Z N has a special role to interpret the meaning behind full collateralization. In addition, if
T .

Let m N t denote the amount of variation margin posted at t ≤ T . Similarly, m N t ≥ 0 (resp. m N t < 0) means that the hedger posts (resp. receives) the margin to the counterparty at time t ≤ T . For the admissibility, (m N t ) t≥0 is assumed to be F-adapted càdlàg process, and the difference between the market exposure and variation margin is bounded. This bounded difference is assumed only for an FBSDE, which we shall see later, to be well-posed. Hence, practically, we can choose the boundary just extremely wide. In addition, note that m N is chosen to be Fadapted for consistency in financial modeling. Recall that by Assumption ., the default times allow intensities. Thus, τ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are totally inaccessible, i.e., defaults come with surprise. On the other hand, the collateral is required because we do not know the full information of default. Therefore, the amount of collateral is calculated only by available information, namely F. The admissible set will be defined more precisely when the risk-sharing problem is introduced.
Once one party announces bankruptcy, the margin process stops. Therefore, at the default τ ≤ T , the amount of collateral is m N τ− . In summary, at τ ≤ T , e N τ + ∆D N τ (= e N τ a.s) should be paid by the hedger to the counterparty, and the pledged collateral is m N τ− . In addition, the loss by breach of the contract will be inflicted to the counterparty (resp. hedger) only when τ = τ H and e N τ ≥ m N τ− (resp. τ = τ C and e N τ < m N τ− ). Therefore, denoting the loss rate of hedger (resp. counterparty) by L H (resp. L C ), the amount by breach is
We assume that L i , i ∈ {H, C}, are constant. Finally, we can define the full cash-flows (only with the new contract) C N as
By (.) and the last item in Lemma ., ∀t ≤ T , almost surely
.. Incremental Cash-flows
So far, only the new contract has been taken into account. Now, we turn to incremental cash-flows. To this end, assume that the bank has contracts given by some endowed càdlàg F-adapted processes (D E , e E , m E ) before initiation of the new contract. If the hedger does not enter the new contract, the cash-flows remain as
On the other hand, with the new contract, the exposure and margin become (e E + e N ) and (m E + m N ), respectively. Therefore, with the new contract, the summed cash-flows are
Thus, the amount that should be dealt with by the hedger is the increment from C E to C S , namely for t ≤ T ,
In the next section, we define self-financing portfolios to hedge against C with more details. We construct the portfolio in view of the hedger since the counterparty's portfolio is just in the opposite position. Before proceeding, we provide some remarks related to possible extensions of our model.
One may argue that clean price is not an appropriate close-out amount since the counterparty's default is not considered. However, taking default risk of the counterparty into the exposure may heavily penalize the surviving party, because the default event of one party can affect negatively the creditworthiness of the surviving party, especially when the defaulting member has an impact on systemic risk. For such discussion, readers can refer to Brigo & Morini () .
(ii) In practice, variation margin is called on intra-day basis (say, two or three times per day).
In this paper, we assume a continuous margin process for simplicity. One may want to model variation margin as a càdlàg step process to describe reality more precisely (for example, Brigo, Liu, et al., ).
(iii) Underlying assets subject to defaults are beyond the scope of this paper since we assume (.). For modeling with emphasis on contagion risk, readers may want to refer to Bo et al. ( (iv) In reality, it is hard to estimate exact default intensities. For example, dependence between counterparty's exposure and default probability is not negligible, which is sometimes called right/wrong way risk, but it is challenging to estimate the dependence from market quotation. Thus, such issues lead to robust pricing arguments (Bichuch et al., b; Glasserman & Yang, ) .
.. Self-Financing Hedging Portfolio
Trading desks should finance to maintain their hedging portfolio. The funding source can be an external funding provider, treasury department, repo markets, etc. After the financial crisis, such funding rates do not represent the risk-free rate (approximately OIS rate in recent times). We let F-adapted processes (R i,m t ) t≥0 , i ∈ {H, C}, represent the margin funding rates offered from margin lenders, and denote that for t ≤ T , Another cash-flow stream associated with margin process is remuneration from margin receivers. When variation margin is pledged by (resp. received by) the hedger, the counterparty should remunerate (resp. should be remunerated by) the hedger with respect to an interest rate. We let r m and B m denote the margin rate and account of the hedger. Therefore, for each party, the net cost/benefit involved in posting the margin is determined by R i,m − r m , i ∈ {H, C}, and we denote this spread by s i,m , i.e.,
In general, rehypothecation is allowed for variation margin, in other words, the margin account can be used to maintain the hedging portfolio.
Remark .. The interest rate between the two parties for variation margin is often chosen as federal funds rate, EONIA rate, etc. In other words, r m = r in practice.
We assume that the two parties should finance by interest rates R i , i ∈ {H, C}, for constructing the rest of their portfolio. In addition, we denote the associated funding accounts and spreads by B i and s i , i ∈ {H, C}, respectively, i.e., 
).

We assume that ϕ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are G-predictable. We use the convention that a positive unit of trading strategy means long position. In addition, the hedger should hold η m B m as much as the margin amount and fund from B H,m to deliver this amount. Thus, we have ≤ 0, at t ≤ T , the hedger borrows collateral from the margin lender and post it to the counterparty at t. In this case, the hedger is remunerated from the counterparty, i.e., η m t ≥ 0. Remark .. (i) m E is dealt with before the new contract, so it is not a part of the hedging portfolio. m E appears only in the incremental cash-flows C.
(ii) As in practice, we consider cash collateral which is rehypothecated. Sometimes it is possible that risky assets can be posted as collateral and the margin account is segregated, which means that the account is not included in the hedging portfolio. When we consider a different convention, the mathematical structure of wealth process also become different. 
The counterparty's self-financing portfolio is defined similarly. The difference is the direction of variation margin and C. Then, by (.), (.), (.)-(.), we can see that self-financing portfolio processes of the hedger and, similarly, counterparty follow
where ⊙ is component-wise product. If we consider a non-financial firm as the counterparty, we set η C,S = 0. Before examining whether (.) and (.) are well defined, we first want to introduce our target problem. We find the best initial price and amount of variation margin to optimize the aggregated utilities of both parties. Without any adjustment, at initiation of the contract, the classical riskneutral price e N 0 , should be exchanged. Let p denote the amount paid to the hedger on top of e N 0 . In other words, initial price paid to the hedger is e N 0 +p. More precisely, denoting the initial endowment of each party by e H and e C ,
Thus, V i depends on the choice of (p, m N ). Often, for simplicity of notations, we suppress (p, m N ), e.g.,
Then, with an admissible set A, utilities U i : R → R, and λ > 0, we define the risk-sharing problem as follows:
A is defined precisely in the following section, and for utilities, we will investigate two cases:
for some γ i > 0. We will see later that we need different restrictions to funding spreads depending on the choice of utilities for characterizing the optimal collateral. The restrictions are required mainly because the value functions w.r.t variation margin is not concave. The detail will be explained later.
Remark .. (i) Again, the counterparty may or may not be a financial firm. If the counterparty is not a financial firm, risky assets are not included in the portfolio, i.e., η C,S = 0. Note that hedging strategies are not control variables. In other words, we assume that two parties choose their strategies by their own methodologies not by the risk-sharing framework.
(ii) λ can be interpreted as the relative bargaining power of the counterparty, or how much the hedger wants to enter the contract. λ may also interpret the belief of two parties about the level of possibility that DVA can be monetized and the level of market frictions that makes funding spreads included in derivative transactions.

Recall that p * is the amount paid to the hedger on top of e N 0 . This additional payment is necessary because of default risk and funding spreads. If two parties price the contracts individually, the calculated prices may be different to each party because of different funding spreads. Therefore, when the contract is made with the initial price e N 0 +p * , some parties should accept a cost. p * can be seen as the cost that is agreed by the two parties to enter the contract, so we call p * agreement-cost . We also call m * optimal collateral (or margin), and (p * , m * ) risksharing contract. Before giving the detail, we first provide the motivation behind the choice of our model (.), especially about the necessity and location of the discounting factors.
In (.), the values of the portfolios were adjusted by discounting factors. The discounting factors are necessary for a fairness since the two agents have different funding rates. In general, the higher default risk is, the higher funding rate is. However, a hedging portfolio grows with respect to its funding rate (recall (.) and (.)). Therefore, without the discounting factors, we penalize a party under a healthier credit condition.
One may want to put the discounting factors outside of utilities as it is a typical choice in portfolio optimization literature. In this case, when the portfolio processes evolve forwardly, the effect of funding rates is mixed with the the risk aversion γ i , i ∈ {H, C}. However, the future value is purely discounted without consideration of risk aversions, so we would again end up with punishing or rewarding a certain party depending on risk aversions. Worse, the solutions may be highly sensitive to the hyper parameters γ i , i ∈ {H, C}. Let us explain the points with more details by a simple example.
Example .. Consider (.) and a hedger buying an uncollateralized bond of unit notional amount from a counterparty with whom the hedger does not have any previous contract, i.e., e E = m E = 0, D N = −1 T ,∞ , and m N = 0. We assume all parameters are constant, and there is no default risk and initial endowment. If the hedger valuates the contract by risk-neutral pricing, at t = 0, the hedger would, because of the funding cost, want to "pay"
In other words, the hedger's individual adjustment for the price would be −e −R H T + e −rT . This individual value is not likely to be recouped from the counterparty, because, in view of the counterparty, the value is −e −R C T + e −rT . We want the agreement-cost p * to be chosen properly somewhere between −e −R H T + e −rT and −e −R C T + e −rT . What we meant by "properly" is that the nature of p * should not be too different from e −R H T − e −rT and e −R C T − e −rT . Recall that, based on our model, the initial value of the hedger's portfolio is
Thus, since we want that p * ≈ − e −R i T − e −rT , i ∈ {H, C}, a desirable feature is that p * increases with respect to R i . We will check that this is satisfied in (.), but not valid without discounting factors. It follows that
In (.), p * increases w.r.t R i , i ∈ {H, C}, and decreases w.r.t the counterparty's bargaining power λ. In addition, the effects to p * due to R i , i ∈ {H, C}, and γ are weakly dependent. Moreover, the asymmetric price is properly adjusted. Indeed, when λ = 1,
which is the average of the (individual) adjustment for the prices by the hedger and counterparty. However, those features are not obtained when we remove or move the discounting factors in (.). Consider a situation that there is no discounting factor. Then we need to solve
Therefore,
In this case, p # may or may not increase with respect to R i , i ∈ {H, C}, and sometimes this can lead to penalizing a healthier party. In addition, p # is highly sensitive to γ and it is unclear how the adjustment value p # is affected by funding rates. In addition, if we locate the discounting factors outside the utilities, the risk aversions, γ i , i ∈ {H, C}, will be altered by the discount e −R i t . Therefore, the choice may lead to the similar problems in p # . In a similar context, Sircar & Zariphopoulou () chose the same setup to consider defaults of multiple firms.
Remark .. A condition of funding transfer policy (FTP) that is beneficial to both parties was discussed by Albanese et al. () . (.) is one of the choices satisfying their condition (see Albanese et al., , Proposition .). However, there may be many choices of the FTP satisfying the condition, so instead, we investigate the prices which are the best to the parties.
In the next section, we represent (.) in a reduced form with a more precise definition of the admissible set. (.) is one type of principal-agent problems. This problem is often called the first best case in typical principal-agent context. In general, it is challenging to solve principal-agent problems because the solvability of involved equations, e.g. coupled FBSDEs, is not easy to obtain (one special solvable case is reported in Appendix B). Since we also encounter a similar difficulty as well as non-concavity, we need to modify the dynamic version of our problem and impose some restrictions depending on the utilities. We will explain this point with more detail in Section .
. Reduction of Filtration
We start this section with giving a long list of notations. The following notations are often used in this paper. For i ∈ {H, C}, t ≥ 0,
We give some remarks on the above notations.
Remark .. By (.),V i , i ∈ {H, C} are (discounted) adjustment processes. By (.), v N is the discounted market exposure, and c N is the discounted collateral, and δ N is the difference between the two processes. For example, δ * = 0 means that full collateralization is optimal. By (.), ∆ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are the delta risk of the market exposure adjusted by the funding rate of each party. By (.),φ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are the difference between the amount invested in the risky assets and delta risk of the clean price,i.e.,φ i can be seen as the hedging error. If the counterparty is a non-financial firm,φ C = ∆ C . Notice that if b i = 0, then R i = r, by (.).
We will find the projections ofV i onto F, then we will deal with the risk-sharing problem mainly with the reduced processes. For any i ∈ {H, C}, we let φ i denote the F-predictable reduction ofφ i untilτ. Namely, φ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are F-predictable and
By Itô's formula and (.), v N satisfies, ∀t ≤ T ,
Note that v N is exogenously given. Thus, if R i , i ∈ {H, C}, are independent with V i andV i are well-defined, then V i are also well defined by (.). 


Then, the following processes v H and v C , are well-defined:
Moreover, assume that R i , i ∈ {H, C}, are independent with V i , and
Then v i , i ∈ {H, C}, are F-optional reductions ofV i untilτ, i.e., v i , i ∈ {H, C}, are F-optional and
Proof. It is easy to check the first assertion. The second part can be easily checked by Itô's formula. By applying Itô's formula to (B 
In addition, by (.) together with
v N τ = v N τ− , a.s, (B H t ) −1 dC t = 1 t≤τ (B H t ) −1 dD N t + d(1 τ≤t )v N τ− − d(1 τ≤t )Θ τ (δ N τ− ). It follows that dV H t = d (B H t ) −1 (V H t ) − v N t∧τ =1 t≤τ s H,m t δ N t + s H,∆ t v N t +φ H t Λ H t + ∆ H t b H t dt + 1 t≤τφ H t dW t − 1 t>τ (B H t ) −1 dD N t − d(1 τ≤t ) v N τ− − Θ τ (δ N τ− ) . It follows that d 1 t<τV H t =V H t− d(1 t<τ ) + 1 t≤τ dV H t − δτ(dt)∆V H τ =V H τ− d(1 t<τ ) + 1 t≤τ s H,m t δ N t + s H,∆ t v N t +φ H t Λ H t + ∆ H t b H t dt + 1 t≤τφ H t dW t − d(1 t≥τ ) v N τ− − Θ τ (δ N τ− ) − δτ(dt)∆V H τ =1 t≤τ dv H t − d(1 t≥τ )V H τ − d(1 t≥τ ) v N τ− − Θ τ (δ N τ− ) . Let Y t ≔ 1 t<τ v H t + 1 t≥τ (v H τ− − v N τ− + Θ τ (δ N τ− )). Again, by Itô's formula together with v N τ = v N τ− , a.s, dY t =1 t≤τ dv H t − d(1τ ≤t )v H t− + d(1τ ≤t ) v H τ− − v N τ− + Θ τ (δ N τ− =1 t≤τ dv H t − d(1τ ≤t ) v N τ− − Θ τ (δ N τ− ) .
It follows that if
Similarly, we can attain that
In what follows, we assume s i , s i,m , i ∈ {H, C}, are bounded and
A stronger condition will be given to the control variable δ N by defining an admissible set. Notice that control of m N is equivalent to that of δ N since e N is given exogenously. Thus, we solve (.) with respect to the two state processes depending on δ N :
In what follows, we also denote that for i ∈ {H, C},
Notice that when the margin lenders do not require any excessive cost, i.e., s i,m = 0, i ∈ {H, C}, v i does not depend on δ N and v i =ṽ i . Recall that our goal is to maximize the sum of utilities of discounted portfolios:
To this end, we represent the two terms in (.) as reduced forms. Indeed, by Lemma ., where the integrability conditions hold
where
.
Now, for a given Borel set A ⊆ R, we define an admissible set D(= D(A, U H , U C )) of collateral as follows:
Definition .. δ N ∈ D, if δ N ∈ H 2 T and (i) δ N ∈ A, dP ⊗ dt − a.
s, (ii) (.) and (.) have a path-wise unique solution, (iii) E G T U H (v
Then, the risk-sharing problem can be rewritten as Remark .. (i) Even though the modeling is motivated by principal-agent problems, the mathematical structure of our risk-sharing problem is different from that of typical principalagent problems. For example, for the hedger, in both perspectives of funding impacts and loss given defaults, posting collateral to counterparty is not beneficial. Thus, if we consider the hedger as an agent subject to the counterparty as a principal and solve the agent problem first, e.g., as in Cvitanić et al. () , it always gives the trivial solution δ * = v N − c * = ∞.

(ii) One may want to take stochastic calculus of variation as in Cvitanic & Zhang () . However, note that g is piece-wise concave in δ. Even when g is concave, it may not be differentiable. Therefore, if we take stochastic calculus of variation, we will face a very challenging FBSDE with a discontinuous coefficient in the drift of (forward) SDE. A similar case was dealt with by Chen et al. () . However, in our case, we encounter multi-dimensional FBSDE with a degenerate volatility and unbounded coefficients. The solvability of such FBSDE is beyond the scope of this paper and we leave it as future research. Instead, in this paper, we impose some conditions on funding cost/benefit in delivering the collateral, s i,m , i ∈ {H, C}, depending on the utilities, and use verification argument.
 Optimal Collateral
In this section, we characterize the optimal collateral in the risk-sharing problem by using martingale optimality principle. Then, the solution is justified by verification argument. First, we solve the problem with respect to only variation margin δ N , with a fixed initial price p ∈ R:
Then, the agreement-cost p * will be found with the given optimal variation margin δ * . However, mainly because of the non-concave property of our problem addressed in Remark ., we need to impose some restrictions to the funding spreads in delivering collateral for the characterization. We consider two cases: a risk-neutral hedger and risk-averse counterparty investing their capital with a small leverage so that s C,m = 0, and two risk averse parties with s C,m = s H,m = 0.
In the following sections, we first derive an optimal collateral for both cases, then we give financial interpretations later. The two most notable features are the weak dependence with default intensities and relationship with the full margin requirement. The discussion about the relationship between the optimal collateral and margin requirement is an important part of this paper. The conditions on funding spreads can be assumed not only when the capital structure of a party has small leverage but also when the party achieves secured funding for variation margin. This situation is not common, but some examples for the secured funding were discussed by Albanese et al. () . There is another interpretation to keep the funding condition without loss of much generality, which is partly justified by a complete market argument. It was shown in complete market models that hedgers can guarantee that they do not switch their position of funding state between lending and borrowing position, depending on the structure of the payoff. This binary nature of funding state is related to whether payoff functions are nonincreasing or non-decreasing with respect to underlying assets. For the details, see Proposition . in El Karoui et al. () and refer to Lee & Zhou () . This funding condition is not necessary for finding p * if δ is not a control variable, e.g. A = {δ 0 } for some δ 0 ∈ R.

. Risk-neutral Hedger
In this section, we suppose that the hedger is risk-neutral, i.e., U H (x) = x, ∀x ∈ R, and the counterparty is risk-averse with
We also suppose that the counterparty can deliver the collateral without any excessive cost/benefit, i.e., s C,m = 0. In this case, v C does not depend on δ N . More precisely, v C =ṽ C . Before moving on, we slightly modify (.) by merging the one terminal condition
T , the Itô's integral term is an (F, P)-local martingale. Thus,
Thus, (.) can be written as
Then, we define a dynamic version of (.) and use martingale optimality principle (MOP) as in Jiao & Pham () . To make use of martingale optimality principle, we define a set of controls which coincide with a given ε ∈ D up to a certain time t ≤ T . We denote the set by D(t, ε), i.e., for ε ∈ D,
Then, we characterize the optimal collateral by using martingale optimality principle. By MOP, (J ε t ) 0≤t≤T is chosen as a càdlàg version such that ∀ε ∈ D,
is an (F, P)-supermartingale. Moreover, for the optimal collateral δ * for J 0 ,
is an (F, P)-martingale. When the admissibility is guaranteed, a solution to (.) can be found by verification. The detail is summarized in the next theorem. 
is a solution of (.).
Remark .. Recall the definition that h ∆ = h − h 0 . When τ H and τ C are independent h = h 0 . In this case, I = 0. Therefore, I can be understood as a correcting term of collateral for the dependence of default times. Then, since Y is independent of ε ∈ D, by the assumption of admissibility of δ(ṽ H ,ṽ C ), for any ε ∈ D,
is an (F, P)-supermartingale. It follows that for any ε ∈ D,
Moreover, notice that I T = 0 and (
Hence, (.) is obtained, and by the admissibility, δ(ṽ H ,ṽ C ) is a solution of (.). Ú
The last step is to show δ(ṽ H ,ṽ C ) is admissible given some conditions. We consider A = R and find the explicit form of δ(ṽ H ,ṽ C ) for the case. Then, the integrability condition is easy to  check. First, notice thatg + ,g − are continuously differentiable and strictly concave in δ. Thus, for any (t, v H , v C 
Then, it is easy to check that δ(ṽ H ,ṽ C ) is attained at I − , I + , and −δ E . Observe the precise forms ofg i , i ∈ {−, +}, arẽ
Therefore, assuming h i L i > 0, i ∈ {H, C}, I i , i ∈ {−, +}, can be explicitly represented as
Then Theorem . is completed by the next lemma.
Proof. Sinceṽ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are independent of the choice of collateral and α i and φ i are bounded, the existence and uniqueness of v i are easy to obtain in S 2 T . Let Ψ := e Dṽ C for D > 0. By Itô's formula,
By the assumptions, the coefficients in (.) are uniformly Lipsitch continuous. Thus, there exists a unique solution of (.) such that
Now, it suffices to check the integrability condition (.) for I − , I + . Notice that
Then, by (.), the admissibility holds. Ú Example .. Suppose δ E = 0 and τ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are indeendent on F. Therefore, h ∆ = 0 and I = 0. Moreover, consider a hedger who hedges delta risk and a non-financial counterparty, i.e.,
They enter a bond contract that is paid by the hedger. Namely,
We assume that OIS rate (r t ) t≥0 follows the next SDE:
t , for some k, θ, ρ ∈ R and a risk-neutral measure Q. Moreover, we assume that h i , i ∈ {H, C}, are bounded and s C = s C,m = 0. Recall the third item in Lemma . and (.). Then, by ClarkOcone formula, for t ≥ 0,
, where
Hence, all conditions in Lemma . are satisfied.
Before analyzing the financial interpretations behind the optimal collateral, we exmaine one simpler case that the both parties are risk-averse and acquire the collateral with secured funding, i.e., s H,m = s C,m = 0.

. Two Risk-averse Parties
In this section, we suppose the two parties are risk-averse with
In what follows, we denote
Before moving on, to represent the optimal collateral by one stochastic process, we define a
. Then, (.) will be represented w.r.t X, and X is given by
Notice that J t is independent of ε ∈ D and by (.) and (.),
is an (F, P)-supermartingale. Thus, (.) is obtained where the admissibility of δ * (p, X) is guaranteed. Ú
To find the explicit form of δ * (p, X), let us consider A = R and begin with representing (.) as
for some functions f − , f + . Then, f i , i ∈ {−, +} are continuously differentiable in δ and for any (t, p, x) ,
Then, δ * (p, X) can be attained at I − , I + as well as −δ E . Note that f − and f + are defined as
It follows that
Therefore, we obtain that
The exact form of δ * can be obtained by characterizing the region
The calculation of the region is a straightforward but tedious (see Carassus & Pham, , for example) . We only obtain the exact form for a simple case which will be seen later. With some similar conditions to those in Lemma ., the admissibility is obtained. The proof is similar and we omit it
Now, we are ready to discuss the financial interpretation of the optimal collateral. In the next section, the financial meanings of (.)-(.), (.)-(.) and the relationship with the margin requirement will be discussed.
. Analysis of Collateral
In this section, we provide financially interpretations of the optimal collateral derived in the previous sections. For simplicity, we suppose all parameters are constant and τ i , i ∈ {H, C}, are independent on F, i.e., I = 0. It is obvious that default risks are the main factors to determine the optimal collateral, but recall that in our model, there are two components in default risks, loss rates and default intensities. We begin this section with discussing weak dependence between the optimal collateral and default intensities.
First, we consider the optimal collateral in Section .. For simplicity, we consider γ C = γ H . Then, taking t = 0 in (.) and (.) leads to
Note that the optimal collateral depends only on the loss rates L i not on default intensities h i , which is a rather natural consequence. Collateral is required for loss given default not for the default itself. Put differently, collateral is about how much loss would be inflicted at default and not about how likely default occurs. Recalling δ * = v N − c * and observing (.) and (.), the magnitude of the optimal variation margin c * increases as L i , i ∈ {H, C}, increase.
To understand the effect of loss rates more preceisly, we consider a simple case that δ E = 0 and derive an explicit form of δ * (p, X).
Remark .. From (.)-(.), the major factor for collateral is the loss rate. In practice, loss rates are often chosen as 0.6 regardless of entities. Our model together with the practice on loss rates partly explains the margin requirement applied to all banks. X) . In this case, as L C increases, c * = v N −δ * (p, X) decreases because of the increased average loss of collateral posted to the counterparty. On the other hand, when δ * (p, X) ≥ 0, the optimal collateral c * = v N −δ * (p, X), is independent of L C and increases w.r.t L H . Again, this is because the high loss rate makes it risky for the counterparty to post collateral to the hedger.
However, recall that the results in Section . are derived on the assumption s H,m = s C,m = 0. In general, funding spreads can be determined by default intensities, so considering funding spreads for delivering collateral naturally makes the optimal solution depend on default intensities. Indeed, at t = 0, the optimal solution in Section . δ(ṽ H ,ṽ C ), is attained at −δ E 0 or
which depend on h H and h C . As in (.) and (.), when s H,m = 0, they are reduced to
and become independent of h i , i ∈ {H, C}. However, even in the case of (.) and (.), the dependence with h i , i ∈ {H, C}, can be understood as that with liquidity premium. Two main factors to determine funding spreads are default risks and liquidity premium. Suppose the hedger finances from the treasury department, i.e., s H = s H,m . Then we may consider
where ℓ is the hedger's liquidity premium. Then in (.),
 Therefore, I − decreases as ℓ increases, i.e., as there are more liquidity pressure to the hedger.
Recalling that δ * = v N − c * , the higher the liquidity premium is, it becomes less beneficial to the both parties to transfer collateral to the counterparty. The relationships with p, λ, and δ E are self-explanatory. If the contract starts from giving a high price, p, to the hedger at initiation of the contract, the hedger needs to post more collateral in return. Moreover, the strong bargaining power the counterparty λ makes the hedger post more collateral. In addition, if significant portion of the endowed exposure remains before this new contract, i.e., δ E , the optimal collateral is adjusted so as to reduce the amount. This is why −δ E is added to (.)-(.) and (.)-(.).
In addition, from (.)-(.) and (.)-(.), we can observe that as the portfolio of the hedgerṽ H (resp. counterpartyṽ C ) performs well, c * increases (resp. decreases). In other words, when one party's portfolio performs well, it is optimal to share the profit by posting more collateral to the other party. In the next section, we interpret financial meanings of the dependence withṽ H andṽ C with more details.
. Analysis of the Margin Requirement
In this section, we interpret the meaning behind the inter-dealer market convention that is required by Basel III. Recall that the inter-dealer convention is δ * = v N − c * = 0 and δ E = 0, dP ⊗ dt-a.s. Therefore, I i = 0, for any t ≤ T , a.s. The both cases of Section . and Section . are derived on the assumption s C,m = 0. This condition can be guaranteed not only for a counterparty with small leverage, e.g., non-financial form, but also to general counterparties exchanging a certain class of derivatives. Therefore, to interpret the inter-dealer convention, we suppose that the counterparty of the hedger is a financial firm making a contract whose payoffs have a certain structure to guarantee In what follows, we, moreover, assume that all parameter are constant and the default times are independent on F, i.e., I = 0. We consider the case of risk-neutral hedger discussed in Section .. Assuming s C,m = δ E = 0, by (.) and (.), full collateralization requires that
In particular, for the requirement by Basel III to be truly optimal,
should be constant. Thus, (.) implies that φ C = π C + ∆ C = 0, i.e., delta-hedge, and
Consider a contract such that Z N 0, so necessarily v N 0 and ∆ C 0. Since (.) should hold for all contracts such that Z N 0, (.) implies that
Equivalently, by (.), (.), (.),
Therefore, the margin requirement hinges on the assumption of absence of funding impacts and delta-hedge of the counterparty. No property of the hedger's hedging strategy was derived since we assumed the hedger is risk-neutral. To complete the results of this section, in what follows, we only consider the case in Section .. By (.) and (.), the full margin convention requires It follows that π H = ∆ H and π C = −∆ C . In other words, the two parties should hedge the delta-risk of market exposure. In addition, by (.),
Similarly, the margin requirement implies s H = s C = 0. One last ingredient for the requirement to be optimal is the initial price. By (.),
Therefore, p should be chosen aŝ
We callp convention-price.

Remark .. Note thatp does not depend on h i , L i , i ∈ {H, C}, because the price is derived from fully collateralized contracts. Moreover, when γ C = γ H =: γ and e C = e H = 0,
Thus, in this case,p merely represents the adjustment in the initial price by the different negotiation power between the two parties. Notice that when the two parties have the same negotiation power, i.e., λ = 1,p = 0.
The above ansatz was derived with s C,m = 0 at the first step, so one may think that this argument can be applied only to counterparties investing their capital without (or with small) leverage. However, for some contracts, funding spread does not play any role as discussed in Section ). Thus, the condition on the counterparty's funding spread for collateral, s C,m = 0, does not restrict the class of counterparties that we can apply the above argument. Then, since the market convention, δ * = 0, is applied to all bilateral contracts, the margin requirement implies that
• p is chosen as convention-price:
• both parties are banks hedging the delta risk of clean price,
• funding spread is not transferred to each party.
The third item seems expected result because the condition δ * = 0 inherently considers two parties whose earnings from the margin is symmetric. If one can make a profit or suffer a loss by margin process, δ * = 0 may not be optimal. A debate is still underway whether funding spreads should be recouped from counterparties and how to handle the accounting (see Albanese & Andersen, ; Andersen et al., ; Castagna, ; Hull & White, a,b) . Indeed, in frictionless markets, as MM theorem properly applies, choices of funding are separated with pricing. However, with frictional distress costs, shareholders' decision may depend on the choices of funding. In such cases, the margin requirement is not optimal anymore. Therefore, the third condition on funding costs can be understood that the margin requirement of Basel III inherently considers frictionless financial markets. Note thatp is derived by "guess", not solving the risk-sharing framework (.). Indeed, if s i = φ i = 0, i ∈ {H, C}, i.e., delta-hedge and no funding spread,p is optimal, i.e., p * =p. To show this, we will obtain a maximum principle of p * for (.) in the next section. In what follows, we only consider the case in Section .. Mainly because of an issue from non-concavity, for finding the optimal pair (p * , δ * ), we need either s C,m = s H,m = 0 or A = {δ 0 }, for some δ 0 ∈ R. The second condition means that the variation margin c is fixed as a given process. In addition, notice that we need two conditions on s H,m and s C,m where we control two variables (p, δ), while one condition, s C,m = 0, was enough to deal with δ.

. Optimal Initial Price
Throughout this section, we assume that for i ∈ {H, C},
and −δ E , α i , φ i are bounded so that the admissibility such as Lemma . is obtained. The next maximum principle for p * is basically a first order condition. First, we consider the case that δ is not a control variable, i.e. A = {δ 0 }, for some δ 0 ∈ R.
, and for given t ≤ T , define Q t ∈ R 2 as the set that f * t (·) is not differentiable. Assume
Then p * is the optimal initial price.
Proof. Notice that f * t (·) is concave ∀t ≤ T , so is differentiable a.e. The maximum principle (.), is basically a first order condition. We only need to check whether (p * , X * ) is not absorbed in Q. Since we assume A = {δ 0 }, for some δ 0 ∈ R, δ * does not depend on (p, X). We let, for any process ϕ, ϕ * ≔ ϕ p * and, for arbitrary p ∈ R, ∆ϕ * ≔ ϕ p − ϕ * . Then, 
 Examples
When both parties hedge only delta risk of clean price and funding spreads are ignored,p actually does solve the risk-sharing problem with δ * = 0. On the other hand, when one party does not hedge the delta risk, (p * , δ * ) (p, 0), which is aligned with the general practice of contracts between a financial firm and non-financial firm. In addition, we give an example that a bank buys Treasury bond. In frictional financial markets, pricing may depend on chocies of funding. However, banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding rates. The risk-sharing framework can explain how the impact of funding cost is reduced. By (.)-(.), δ * = 0. Therefore, the optimal contract follows the market convention, i.e., (p * , δ * ) = (p, 0). Note that when γ C = γ H , e H = e C = 0, λ = 1, thenp = 0. Thus, in this case, (p * , δ * ) = (0, 0).
Remark .. Notice thatp is not affected by default risk, h i and L i . This is because the default risk is reduced by full collateralization, δ * = 0.
Example . (Non-financial counterparty). Let s i,m = 0, i ∈ {H, C}, δ E = 0, and π H = ∆ H , π C = 0, i.e., φ H = 0, φ C = ∆ C . We consider constant default intensities and, without loss of generality, assume that γ H = γ C , L H = L C = 0.5, λ = 1, and e i = 0, i ∈ {H, C}. Therefore, ∀t < T , Since γ H = γ C , we denote U ≔ U H = U C . By straightforward calculation, we can check that Q t = ∅, ∀t ≤ T , and
Recall that X T increases as p increases. Therefore, both ∂ pf +∂ xf and [U ′ (X T )−U ′ (−p)] decrease w.r.t p. Moreover, both terms tend to ∞ (resp. −∞) as p → −∞ (resp. p → ∞). Thus, there exists p ∈ R satisfying (.). Once p * is obtained, δ * can be found as well, but in this case, (p * , δ * ) may not be (p, 0), i.e., full collateralization may not be optimal.
Example . (Treasury bonds). We consider a bank who wants to buy a Treasury bond, i.e., ∀t ≤ T , D N t = −1 t≥T and e N t = −e −r(T −t) . We ignore default risk of the government and assume that there has been no contract before buying this bond, i.e., h C = s C = s C,m = 0 and δ E = 0. For simplicity, all parameters, r, s H , and h H are constant. It follows that ∆ i = φ i = 0, i ∈ {H, C}. We choose L H = 0.6 and s H = s H,m = L H h H . In addition, we consider a fixed, partly pledged variation margin. Namely, A = {ǫ}, for some 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ −v Note that under the same negotiation power (λ = 1), the effect of funding becomes exactly half.
 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new risk-sharing framework to understand how two parties enter bilateral contracts with presence of entity-specific information such as default risk and funding spreads. Based on our model, we can explain why banks buy Treasury bonds that return less than their funding rate. The analysis of the optimal collateral in the risk-sharing framework interprets the meaning behind the margin requirement in Basel III: two parties hedge delta risk of clean price and funding spreads are not considered in derivative prices. Note that the full collateralization is really optimal in frictionless financial markets, which is an inherent assumtion in Basel III. It is possible that this conclusion can change if we include gap risk, KVA, and hedging strategies are also control variables. We leave such analysis as a further research topic. Moreover, in recent years, standard derivatives are recommended to be cleared through a central clearing counterparty (CCP). In general, CCPs require variation margin, initial margin, and default fund as collateral. It will be also interesting to find the optimal proportion of margins to minimize the systemic risk of the centrally cleared ecosystem.
